

**STRATEGIC RISK MANAGEMENT****Paul Godden, Corporate Development Department**

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**1. PURPOSE OF THE REPORT**

- 1.1 To present the current Strategic Risk Register.

**2. BACKGROUND**

- 2.1 The Office of Police and Crime Commissioner (OPCC) and Northumbria Police share a joint Strategic Risk Register. Each strategic risk is assigned a Chief Officer/ Director and OPCC owner, who has responsibility for the management of controls and the implementation of new controls, where necessary.
- 2.2 Risks are categorised against each of the four 'Proud to...' areas identified under Proud to Protect. Currently there are:
- 13 risks under Proud to Serve;
  - Three risks under Proud of Our People;
  - 11 risks under Proud to Improve; and
  - Nine risks under Proud to Lead.
- 2.3 The register (Appendix A) identifies each risk and the consequences if it were to happen. The register also provides a summary of existing controls. All risks are regularly reviewed by their respective owners and additional controls identified or changed, where necessary. All risks are rated on the likelihood of the risk occurring and the impact it would have.

**3. CHANGES TO REGISTER**

- 3.1 The key changes to the risk register since the last quarter are outlined below. Appendix B provides an overview of the RAG status of the risks and summary of changes since December 2016.

Existing risks

**Risk 1** – Failure to produce an acceptable Police and Crime Plan

- 3.2 Revisions to the Police and Crime Plan will be in place for the Police and Crime Panel by 28 February 2017. As a result, the likelihood rating has been adjusted to very low (1) and impact to medium (3).

**Risk 11** – Failure to have sufficient appropriate adults to support those detainees in custody. This is not a statutory function of local authorities

- 3.3 Wording has been amended to reflect that the risk relates to the provision of appropriate adults for *vulnerable adult* detainees in custody. Local authorities have a statutory obligation for those under 18; however, this does not extend for adults.

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- 3.4 A plan is in place to develop a trained volunteer service with Sunderland University; therefore, the likelihood has already changed from high (4) to medium (3) and will be further reviewed on implementation. Provision has been agreed to provide trained appropriate adults on a 24 hour basis via a call out system. Training and implementation of the scheme funded by the OPCC will be delivered in early February. A comprehensive service level agreement will be in place to ensure volunteer availability 365 days per annum, with an agreed response time. All volunteers will undergo a selection process (including references) and subject to Disclosure and Barring Service checks. A steering group will be created to oversee performance and to monitor service delivery as well as spontaneous issues and/or complaints.

### **Risks 33 – The loss or inappropriate disclosure of sensitive data**

- 3.5 The impact of the loss or inappropriate disclosure of sensitive data has been reviewed following the circumstances and events that occurred as part of the migration of data from the old Recording of Digital Interviews System (RODI) server to a new virtualised server. Likelihood of the risk/ reoccurrence has been assessed as very low (1); impact has been reassessed as high (4) from medium (3). This assessment is based on the following:
- The events that occurred were not due to a systemic failure;
  - Implementation of all of the recommendations from the recent internal audit exercise further strengthens existing controls to avoid the occurrence of one-off human error;
  - Impact was significant and involved victims, offenders and criminal justice partners.

### New risks

- 3.6 Two new risks have been added to the joint strategic risk register in relation to delays in digital forensic examinations and achievement of ISO accreditation in this area of business.

### **Risk 12 - Severe delays in digital forensic examinations.**

- 3.7 Likelihood has been assessed as very high (5) and impact as high (4). Consequences include:
- Negative impact on investigations, victim care and safeguarding.
  - Negative impact on criminal justice system.
  - Dangerous offenders not being brought to justice in a timely manner.
  - Decreased public confidence.
- 3.8 Controls include the restructure of the Digital Forensics Unit, which will support an improved operating model including equipment, triage, and submission policy.
- 3.9 A temporary increase in staff will eliminate the backlog and investment in digital evidence suites will decrease low level demand.

### **Risk 13 - Failure to achieve ISO/IEC 17025 accreditation for digital device examination.**

- 3.10 Likelihood has been assessed as high (4) as the Force will not be fully accredited by October 2017, and impact as medium (3). Consequences include:

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- Negative impact on the criminal justice system.
- Provision of evidence is undermined.
- Forensic Regulator intervention & consequences including the possible cessation of E Forensics as a Force.

3.11 Controls include the appointment of an ISO manager and preparation of an ISO work plan.

3.12 A pre-assessment and ISO timeline is in place and oversight will be provided at a strategic level.

#### **4. GOVERNANCE**

4.1 Area Commanders, Department Heads and OPCC are responsible for the identification of emerging risks which cannot be controlled locally, and have the potential to prevent the Force and PCC from achieving objectives. These risks are escalated to the PCC and Chief Officers, and recorded on the Joint Strategic Risk Register.

4.2 The register is presented to the Joint Business Meeting between PCC and Chief Constable on a quarterly basis. The Joint Independent Audit Committee (JIAC) and the Joint PCC/ Chief Constable Governance Group provide additional scrutiny and governance on a quarterly basis.

#### **5. CONCLUSION**

5.1 Current risk management processes and procedures continue to help to ensure the effective management of those risks which have the potential to adversely affect the delivery of Force and PCC strategic aims and objectives.

#### **6. RECOMMENDATIONS**

6.1 Members are requested to note the content of the joint Strategic Risk Register.