

<b>JOINT INDEPENDENT AUDIT COMMITTEE</b>	<b>14 May 2018</b>
<b>Strategic Risk Management</b>	
<b>Paul Godden, Corporate Development Department</b>	

## 1. PURPOSE

- 1.1 To present the current Strategic Risk Register.

## 2. BACKGROUND

- 2.1 The Office of Police and Crime Commissioner (OPCC) and Northumbria Police share a joint Strategic Risk Register. Each strategic risk is assigned a Chief Officer/Director and an OPCC owner, who has responsibility for the management of controls and the implementation of new controls where necessary.

### **Strategic Review of Risk Register**

- 2.2 A joint review of the strategic risk register has been completed by the Chief Officer Team and OPCC Interim Chief of Staff. A revised risk register (Appendix A) has been produced and aggregated under the following thematic areas:

- Strategy
- Operational
- Workforce
- Public Confidence
- Regulation and Standards
- Financial
- Infrastructure and Assets
- Information Technology
- Collaboration and Partnership
- Information and Evidence

- 2.3 The thematic areas are based upon an independent analysis of police risk registers to help forces, Office of Police & Crime Commissioners (OPCCs) and audit committees. In Northumbria, there are 29 risks on the revised register with a number of risks in the previous risk register now combined. All of the risks may threaten the effective delivery of the Police and Crime Plan, particularly the Community Confidence objective, with several risks directly relating to the Effective Criminal Justice System.

### **Governance of Risk Register**

- 2.4 The risk register identifies each risk and the consequences if it were to happen. It also provides a summary of existing controls and rates risks on the likelihood of the risk occurring and the impact it would have. All risks are regularly reviewed by the respective owners and additional controls identified or changed, where necessary.
- 2.5 Area Commanders, Department Heads and the OPCC are responsible for the identification of emerging risks which cannot be controlled locally, and have the potential to prevent the Force and PCC from achieving objectives. These risks are escalated to the PCC and Chief Officers via the relevant Operational Delivery Group or Board, and recorded on the Joint Strategic Risk Register.

- 2.6 The register is presented to the Joint Business Meeting (JBM) between the PCC and the Chief Constable on a quarterly basis. The Joint Independent Audit Committee (JIAC) and the Joint PCC/ Chief Constable Governance Group provide additional scrutiny and governance on a quarterly basis.
- 2.7 As part of the 2017/18 Audit Plan, approved by the Joint Independent Audit Committee, the audit of Risk Management and Business Continuity is currently being undertaken.
- 2.8 The Business Assurance and Inspection Team will undertake a review/ inspection of a number of the risks to ensure that appropriate controls in place are.

### **3. CHANGES TO REGISTER**

- 3.1 The key changes/ updates to the risk register following the review are outlined below. An overview of the RAG status of the risks is also provided (Appendix B).

#### **Existing Risks**

- 3.2 A number of risks have been reworded, or in some instances combined, to better reflect the nature of the strategic risk. For example:

#### Operational Risks

- 3.2.1 **Risk 2 – Inability to deliver continuity of service through ineffective Business Continuity Plans** combines and replaces:

- Prolonged industrial action by key members of staff
- Prolonged fuel shortages
- Pandemic outbreak

- 3.2.2 **Risk 3 – Critical incident or other external incident that has a sustained and significant demand on policing resources** now includes the risk associated with a terrorist incident.

#### Public Confidence

- 3.2.3 Death in custody/within police premises or outside, following police contact has been split to better reflect the risks faced.

#### **Risk 10 – Death in custody/ death or serious injury following police contact**

Likelihood has been assessed as low (2), and impact as high (4); and

#### **Risk 11 – Other adverse critical incident, as a result of police action or omission**

Likelihood has been assessed as medium (3), and impact as medium (3).

#### Infrastructure and Assets

- 3.2.4 **Risk 23 – Major disruption to use of key buildings, facilities or other assets and resources** combines and replaces:

- Major disruption to use of key buildings/ facilities
- Power failure at key sites
- Major ICT or telecommunications systems failure

Information and Evidence

- 3.2.5 **Risk 29 - Data quality affecting business and operational decision making and compliance with national standards** now reflects compliance with national requirements.

**New Risks**

- 3.3 Two new risks have been included on the register:

Information Technology

- 3.3.1 **Risk 26 – Ageing IT infrastructure and implementation of future strategy**

Existing systems are now impacting on the Force's efficiency and effectiveness, and in light of timescales for implementation of the IT strategy; key operational systems might be temporarily unavailable.

Controls include effective ICT and Estate strategies, and appropriate funding for ICT services in the capital programme.

Likelihood has been assessed as medium (3), and impact as medium (3).

Collaboration and Partnership

- 3.3.2 **Risk 28 – Inability to maximise the opportunities from collaboration**

Collaboration is currently limited, which may reduce our ability to deliver strategic objectives and limit opportunities to improve service quality and cost effectiveness.

The force is actively looking at opportunities, and we continue to develop multi-agency collaborative working with partners including the formation of Multi- Agency Safeguarding Hubs.

Likelihood has been assessed as low (2), and impact as high (4).

**Risk Removed**

- 3.4 A number of risks have been removed from the register.

- 3.4.1 **Failure to produce an acceptable Police and Crime Plan**

Two acceptable Police and Crime Plans have now been produced and the current plan covers the period 2017 - 2021.

- 3.4.2 **Significant and sustained breakdown in the working relationship between the PCC and Chief Constable**

There is a well-established working relationship between the PCC and Chief Constable, and an appropriate governance and decision making structure in place.

- 3.4.3 **Failure to have sufficient appropriate adults for vulnerable adult detainees in custody. Local authorities have a statutory obligation for those under 18; however, this does not extend to adults.**

An independent 'Appropriate Adults' scheme is operational across Northumbria Police. A cohort of formally trained volunteers from Sunderland University provides an effective support service to vulnerable adult detainees within Police Custody.

**3.4.4 A reduction in grant resources arising from a change to the Home office grant allocation model**

The Home Office has confirmed no change to the funding formula for 2018/19.

**3.4.5 The Force/ OPCC fail to follow relevant laws, regulations, business rules and ethical codes.**

This is very generic risk. Where there is a risk in a specific area such as health and safety or in relation to discriminatory behaviour, this has been retained.

**4. CONSIDERATIONS**

<b>Freedom of Information</b>	<i>Non-exempt</i>
<b>Consultation</b>	Yes
<b>Resource</b>	No
There are no additional financial considerations arising from this report.	
<b>Equality</b>	No
There are no equality implications arising from the content of this report.	
<b>Legal</b>	No
There are no legal considerations arising from the content of this report.	
<b>Risk</b>	No
There are no additional risk management implications directly arising from this report.	
<b>Communication</b>	Yes
<b>Evaluation</b>	No

**5. CONCLUSION**

5.1 Current risk management processes and procedures continue to help to ensure the effective management of those risks which have the potential to adversely affect the delivery of the Police and Crime Plan and strategic objectives of the force.